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Introduction 
Company laws have long been searching for the perfect system of 
safeguards in order to ensure the credibility and solvency of companies, 
and to protect the best interests of the creditors. This understandable 
attempt invoked shifts of paradigms multiple times over the past few 
decades. As the economic environment and market rules have a huge 
impact on the evolution of company laws worldwide, the new challenges 
of the 21
st
 century, especially the aftermath of the most recent financial 
crisis, raise new questions in the area of company law.  
Companies are the creations of national laws, as international business 
law, and even the supranational law of the European Union (EU), have 
not been able to establish a framework system for companies.1 This 
phenomenon results in very diverse concepts for company laws, even in 
countries that are geographically close to each other. Not only universal 
unification or harmonization but regional approximation of laws suffer 
from firm motivation of the states as they all believe that company laws 
must reflect national specialties as part of the culturally diverse field of 
private law.  
Another obvious opposition of the states these days is the fact that 
the company law may boost economy and the willingness of foreign 
investors to start businesses in the given country. In case of a desired 
approximation, even on a regional level, the competitiveness of some 
countries may also be in danger, and investors would not consider com-
pany law as a relevant factor when making their decision on where to 
position the company. The other angle of such diversity is that national 
laws aim to provide safeguards to the creditors in different ways. These 
safeguards may be categorized based on what aspect of company law 
they select as the ground for ensuring warranties.  
__________________________________________________________ 
  1  Court of Justice of the European Union, The Queen vs. H. M. Treasury and 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust Plc. Case 
Number 81/87, Paragraph 20. 
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It can be the core capital, the internal structure and the relationship 
between the various company bodies, or the liability of the key figures 
acting on behalf of the company. None of these ideas were proved to 
be perfect offering a solution to all possible claims of the creditors, 
however, weaknesses and strengths may be identified in the various 
concepts, and the position the state takes on this important questions 
most likely describe the general approach to company law in the given 
country. We tend to believe that every decision in the area of company 
law has impact on the decisions of the investors, therefore, it results 
changes in the attitude of the investors that impact the economy and the 
market in that state.  
However, if we really want to be honest, the nature and content of 
company law is just one of the many factors investors consider when 
making a decision on where and how to run their businesses. Tax laws, 
procedural rules, access to justice and alternative dispute resolution 
methods are equally important, and the obvious factor of consumers’ 
buying power, wealth, political stability and other natural attributes of 
the market all play significant roles in this respect.  
For decades, company laws followed a somewhat simple approach to 
provide safeguards to creditors against the insolvency and fraud of 
companies. This approach believed that, if a business association type 
(typically partnerships) involves background liability of the members for 
the debts of the business association, the core capital has no function in 
providing safeguards to creditors, therefore, minimum requirements for 
the core capital were either non-existent or served only one purpose: to 
get the members engaged in the business activity and make them invest 
something at the formation stage. 
In case the law established for a business association type allowed 
members/shareholders to limit their liability for the debts of the com-
pany, the law commonly imposed a minimum core capital obligation to 
the founders in exchange for their limited liability. This theory worked 
— and in some places it still holds — as a form of pre-check at the stage 
of establishing a company, and allowed company registration courts or 
authorities to decide whether the company complies with the legal 
requirements and can get allowed to step on to the market and start 
conducting business activity. 
Soon, however, this core capital centered concept proved to be 
somewhat inefficient during the operation of companies as the core 
capital requirements at the formation stage could not ensure that those 
acting on behalf of the company take all necessary and reasonable steps 
to prevent the insolvency of the company as their liability was not an 
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issue since they “purchased” their immunity when they complied with 
the minimum core capital requirements.  
The end of the 20
th
 century and then the financial crisis in 2008 urged 
legislators and courts to evolve new concepts in order to guarantee the 
protection of the creditors and to ensure the transparent operation of 
the business associations. Wrongful trading rules, however, were estab-
lished for the managers and those considered to be the key personnel of 
companies at the early stage of the shift of concepts. Still, legislators and 
courts had to face the fact that the decision-making bodies of the com-
panies that consist of the shareholders/partners may play an equally 
important role in pushing the company to insolvency through bad, mali-
cious or unreasonably risky decisions.  
The various models on the relationship between the decision-making 
body and the management of a company also raised concerns that 
shareholders/members may also be liable for the debts of the company 
toward the creditors in certain situations. The liability of shareholders is 
obviously more eminent in private companies, close corporations than in 
public ones as shareholders have a more obvious control over the com-
pany’s operations.  
In addition, in the special situation of company groups (e.g., holdings) 
and dominant, majority shareholders, the liability of shareholders get to 
another dimension. This study analyzes the theoretical considerations 
behind the concept on shareholders’ liability in general, and describes 
selected models and cases in Europe and in the United States in order to 
identify the new trends and cases when the liability of shareholders 
toward the company or its creditors and third parties may be relevant. 
Checks and Balances 
Most company structure models accept that one body of the company, 
the supreme body cannot be seized from its general function: to serve as 
a decision-making body. It also results that the various models leave the 
decision-making power of the supreme body intact and their primary 
focus is on how to ensure that the management is properly supervised 
for the best interest of the company and the shareholders. The supreme 
body, however, has a right to transfer some of its powers to either the 
management or the supervisory board.  
Most jurisdictions leave only a few fundamental decisions in the 
hand of the supreme body: to decide on the financial report of the com-
pany and to decide on what to do with the profit. This is why in many 
public companies, the general meeting of the shareholders is only called 
once a year and only to discuss these two strategical decisions. The rest 
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of their competences are delegated to the management. In the German 
structure model, the supervisory board gets decision-making powers 
over the management of the company in order to promptly sanction any 
irregular or potentially harmful act of the management.2 In this case, 
the shareholders do not have to evaluate the concerns of the super-
visory board, they only have to pick the right and trustworthy members 
to the supervisory board.  
The classic structure concept on the clear separation of duties believe 
that decision-making must remain in the hands of the shareholders. It 
grants the final decision to the supreme body, and the supervisory board 
only monitors the activity of the management and report the irregular or 
potentially harmful acts to the supreme body that will eventually rule on 
the question.3 Finally, the third structure model merges the functions 
of management and supervision into one special body, the board of 
directors that involves executive and non-executive directors as well, 
providing typically majority voting rights to the non-executives in 
questions of the management.4 We should see that the shareholders take 
very different positions depending on which structure model the 
company follows. 
In case of the strong supervisory board and the board of director 
concepts, the shareholders have limited options to get close to the 
operation of the company, therefore, their potential to cause damage to 
third parties or to the company itself is minimal. In case of clear 
separation of powers model, the shareholders can and do keep a close 
eye on the operation of the company, and they may be involved in the 
process that ultimately pushes the company to the edge of insolvency.  
Even in this model, the question of liability may become very 
complicated. Corporate torts also presume some fault on the side of the 
tortfeasors, in our case, the shareholders. Fault, however, is a very 
fragmented category as the method on how to measure someone’s 
negligence or intention strongly depends on the following factors: the 
level of his knowledge, access to information, state of mind, profession-
alism, etc. We cannot state that shareholders are professionals in every 
case and that they understand the way of business in the sector in which 
the company is acting. 
__________________________________________________________ 
  2   Hopt, The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory Board, Law 
Working Paper, Number 305/2016, at p. 3. 
  3  Hopt, The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory Board, Law 
Working Paper Number. 305/2016, at p. 2. 
  4   Hopt, The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory Board, Law 
Working Paper, Number 305/2016, at p. 3. 
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Therefore, general rules are difficult to establish based on the simple 
fact whether the shareholder supported the wrong and harmful decision 
or not. Company laws typically suggest that shareholders are persons 
that also need protection against the management, and minority share-
holders may enjoy extra rights against the decisions of the majority.5 
This approach suggests that shareholders take different positions when 
we examine their level of knowledge, their access to information, and 
their professionalism and competency related to business matters. This 
is why in a limited-liability company, the starting point is that share- 
holders will not be held liable for the debts of the company and for the 
unsatisfied claims of the creditors. Still, it is not difficult to feel the anomaly 
between the function of the supreme body and its members, the share-
holders, and this somewhat lenient interpretation of fault.  
The supreme body of the company has authority over the acting 
organs and persons of the company by electing them, supervising them, 
authorizing them and showing guidance to them through some 
strategical decisions (e.g., amending the instrument of constitution, the 
articles, deciding on raising or reducing capital, etc.). It means that these 
decisions of the supreme body also function as beacons to the manage-
ment, and the acts of the management can only be judged through these 
instructions. If these instructions are proved to be wrong and harmful, 
managers may have a successful defense against a tort claim, and the 
creditors can easily be left without satisfaction.6 The structure of the 
company may seem to be a question of internal matters of the company, 
and still, it has a significant impact on whether the liability of sharehold-
ers may become an issue or not. 
What Interest Does Concept of Limited Liability Protect? 
Limited liability became the essential characteristic for most companies, 
and it successfully resulted that shareholders may invest in multiple 
firms, creating a diverse stock portfolio, while it also led to the fact that 
more investors could participate in the market.7 The doctrine of limited 
liability, however, eroded especially because corporate torts (e.g., envi-
ronmental torts, accounting frauds) claimed for a concept that allowed 
__________________________________________________________ 
  5  Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. 
  6  Mendelson, “A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate 
Torts”, Columbia Law Review, Volume 102, at p. 1231. 
  7  Kahan, “Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical Perspective”, 
Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 97, at p. 1086. 
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creditors to pierce that thick corporate veil. It must be said that the 
concept of limited liability only protects the shareholders’ assets and 
the assets of the company. In addition, the doctrine of limited liability 
only counts if the tort or wrongdoing was committed by the company. In 
case the shareholder acts in a tortious capacity, outside the general scope 
of the limited liability doctrine, he may be held liable personally.  
The important question is to identify these cases when the share-
holders did not act under scope of this principle, rather, they stepped out 
of the veil of the company and committed a tortious act. Limited liability 
should only protect shareholders against the claims of creditors and 
other third parties (e.g., injured parties of a tort claim) if the claim arose 
from an activity that can be recognized as the general risk of conducting 
business activities. A company becoming insolvent does not neces-
sarily mean that it is a case when the shareholders must bear individual 
responsibility for the unsatisfied debts. An extra factor based on the 
circumstances that justify the claim against the shareholders is needed 
This link must be obvious and certain. 
Cases in various jurisdictions analyzed situations when the share-
holders used their limited liability to maliciously satisfy their personal 
needs not in relation to the business activity of the company using the 
company’s assets,8 cases when the shareholders kept the management 
in tight leash and practically forced their will to them that eventually led 
to insolvency,9 and cases when the sole member of the company was 
found personally liable for the debts as the sole purpose of setting up a 
company was to create a scheme, a front to his malicious activity.10 A 
shareholder also was found liable for the company’s debts and the 
doctrine on the corporate veil was pierced by the court when the share-
holder made an economically destructive withdrawal. Such liability, 
however, can only arise if the shareholder intentionally inflicted damage 
on the company by withdrawing assets which would have been neces-
sary to settle the company’s debts, and that led to the insolvency of the 
company.11 All these cases have one thing in common: shareholders 
abused their limited liability, and this is why they were found liable. 
The concept of limited liability of shareholders traces to the original 
approach on companies that these entities are separate from their 
founders, therefore, they have their own assets and their own liability for 
__________________________________________________________ 
  8  Kinney Shoe Corp. vs. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991). 
  9  Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd. (1994) 2 B.C.L.C. 180. 
 10  Flash vs. Conn, 109 U.S. 371. 
 11  Federal Court of Justice, 23 April 2012 (II Z.R. 252/10). 
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the decisions private individuals make on their behalf. Case law attached 
to limited liability, however, changed a lot almost everywhere in the 
world. The famous case of the United Kingdom, Salomon vs. A. 
Salomon & Co. Ltd., set grounds for the theory on the company being 
a separate legal entity back in 1896.12 The case analyzed whether the 
shareholder owning the vast majority of the shares in a company can be 
held liable for the act of the company.  
According to the facts, Salomon transferred to his own company his 
business of making boots and shoes. The company consisted of Salomon 
and his family. The company bought the business from Salomon, and 
issues shares and a debenture secured by a floating charge on the assets. 
The business soon became insolvent, and the creditors argued that 
Salomon and the company were one and the same. They claimed that 
his debenture was void as no one can be his own creditor. The court 
sustained the concept of limited liability and that the company was a 
legal entity separate from its founder and rejected the claim.  
Another case from the common law world, however, took a different 
position even if the claim related to a contractual obligation. In the 
Gilford Motor Company Ltd vs. Horne case, Horne left the Gilford 
Motor Company in order to start his own business in the form of a 
limited liability company.13 When he left, he agreed that he would not 
solicit any of his former employer’s customers. Horne claimed that he 
took that obligation as a private individual and that his newly formed 
company is a separate legal entity that is individually liable for its own 
actions, and he as the shareholder of the company cannot represent 
the company and its will. The court ruled for Gilford Motor and 
observed that the company and Horne were one and the same, and 
Horne committed a fraudulent activity when he tried to go behind his 
contractual obligation by forming a company.  
It is really difficult to see a pattern here. Both cases were about 
contractual obligations, still, the court, in the Salomon case, enforced 
the concepts of limited liability and separate legal entity while, in the 
Gilford Motor Company case, the judge went behind the company veil 
concept and allowed the plaintiff to get protection against the fraudulent 
activity of the shareholder. If one takes an in-depth analysis of the two 
cases, one can see a notable difference in the facts. In Salomon, it is 
difficult to prove the intention of Salomon that forming a limited 
liability company served a fraudulent purpose. Since Salomon’s family 
__________________________________________________________ 
 12   Salomon vs. A Salomon & Co Ltd (1896) U.K.H.L. 1, (1897) A.C. 22. 
 13  Gilford Motor Company Ltd. vs. Horne (1933) Ch. 935. 
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got involved in the business and that required Salomon to transfer his 
successful business to the family-run company, the insolvency does not 
seem to be an intentional fraud of Salomon.  
In the Gilford case, however, Horne clearly set up the company to 
escape from the contractual obligation he took, and therefore the 
exception under the limited-liability rule seemed adequate. The Gilford 
argument also was applicable in the Kelner vs. Baxter case. Baxter and 
two others agreed on behalf of a company yet to be formed to purchase 
trade stock for its business.14 Later, they formed the company, and 
accepted and used the trade stock but never paid for the stock. The court 
ruled that, since the company was not even formed when Baxter and his 
associates took the obligation, they had to bear responsibility for paying 
the stock. The company could not be held liable as it could not ratify a 
pre-incorporation contract with retrospective effect to a date before the 
company existed. The Kelner case proved that courts can easily penetrate 
through the company’s protective veil in cases when the shareholders 
acted with clear fraudulent intention.  
On the other hand, when the shareholder is the one that requires that 
his assets and the company’s assets should be treated one and the same, 
the courts are not willing to accept this argument. Another interesting 
case from the United Kingdom, Macaura vs. Northern Assurance Co. 
Ltd., proves this angle of the dispute.15 Macaura was a landowner who 
sold timber from his estate to a company of which he was the sole 
owner. He insured the timber that was laying on his land under his own 
name as the insured person as shown by the policies issued by the 
insurance company. A few weeks later, the timber was destroyed in a 
fire. Macaura claimed the insurance money based on the insurance 
policy. The insurance company claimed that the timber belonged to the 
company and not to Macaura, and as a consequence of it, the destroyed 
timber was not properly insured, and the insurance company is not 
obliged to pay the insurance money. The court noted that the timber 
belonged to the company at the time of the fire, and Macaura is not 
identical to his private limited-liability company, therefore, he had no 
insurable interest over the timber. 
This brief analysis of some historical cases in the laws of the United 
Kingdom proves that courts are willing to break the concept on the 
shareholders’ limited liability in cases when a clear fraudulent activity or 
intent of the shareholders can be proved. The concept of limited liability, 
__________________________________________________________ 
 14  Kelner vs. Baxter (1866) L.R. 2 C.P. 174. 
 15  Macaura vs. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. (1925) A.C. 619. 
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however, stands in all other cases when the creditors or claimants simply 
wish to use the shareholders’ assets for satisfaction. One may conclude 
that the concept of limited liability of the shareholders separates the 
assets of the company from the assets of the shareholders, and the share-
holders are not held liable for the contractual obligations of the company 
and for its debt under normal circumstances. Simply, until the share-
holders play by the rules and respect the purpose of the limited liability 
principle, they are protected from the company’s creditors and, in general, 
from third party claims. 
Piercing Company’s Protective Veil 
The concept of limited liability was originally created to protect share-
holders from the inevitable risks of business activities and against the 
claims of those that suffer harms and damage as a consequence of the 
risky business activities. The doctrine also wanted to encourage inves-
tors to invest in businesses risking only the money they invested and not 
their own assets. If the doctrine is used to hide a malicious activity 
behind the thick veil of the company, shareholders cannot enjoy the 
protection of limited liability.  
The concept of limited liability might have overcome the norm of 
unlimited liability by the 19
th
 century, legislators in Europe and the 
United States started to come up with excuses under the rule in order to 
make shareholders accountable for certain unlawful behaviors. One 
of the still existing exceptions is the problem when the shareholder 
transfers property to the company at an over evaluation of its true market 
value. Some authors resemble this problem as the problem of “watered 
stocks”.16 Watered stocks are harmful to the other shareholders and 
the company, and to the creditors too. The company makes a bad deal in 
such situations, while the creditors get a false picture on the solvency 
and the capital of the company.  
This concept leads us back to the importance of the minimum core 
capital. Since the core capital was the price for the limited liability and 
an instrument to build trust toward the creditors, any fraudulent activity 
related to the core capital may undermine its importance and function. In 
Europe, most national laws insisted on having an accountant or other 
professional to evaluate the monetary value of any in-kind performance 
a shareholder wanted to contribute with to the core capital. This rule, 
__________________________________________________________ 
 16  Cook, “Watered Stock” — Commissions — “Blue Sky Laws” — Stock Without Par 
Value”, Michigan Law Review, Volume 19, at p. 584. 
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however, disappeared from many legal systems as it, especially in case 
of private companies, formed an unnecessary burden and expense at the 
time of company formation. It led to a more lenient policy that allowed 
shareholders to evaluate the monetary value of the in-kind performance 
with mutual consent, and created liability on their side in case an over 
evaluation was carried out with bad faith.17 
Other historically relevant situations also can be identified in which 
the legislator felt the need for an exception to the limited liability 
principle. In the United States, for example, some states (e.g., New York 
and Illinois), as well as Canada, adopted the concept of shareholder joint 
and several liability for unpaid worker wages.18 This view emerged from 
the fear that limited liability will serve as a tool for the rich to consoli-
date their wealth, to the detriment of the workers.19 In addition, certain 
exceptions were created to hold the shareholders liable for the full extent 
of their investment for company debts.  
It is an important principle when national laws levied the rules on 
when to pay the full amount of the shareholder’s contribution. In private 
companies, it is especially common that the legislator gives grounds for 
delayed payments, and the shareholder only has to provide a certain 
amount of his contributions at the time of formation; the rest may be 
paid at a later period of operation.20 This rule got significant importance 
in the years of the most recent financial crisis. In order to support 
businesses and to make the company formation process easier, mostly 
legislators in the European continent levied the rules on shareholder 
contribution. 
__________________________________________________________ 
 17  In Hungary, Annex 1 II/1(bb) of the Company Registration Act 2006 allows 
shareholders to evaluate the value of the in kind performance without having an 
auditor to perform this action. 
 18  Tucker, “Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: 
From Condition of Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy”, Law & 
History Review, Volume 26, at p. 66. 
 19  Tucker, “Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: 
From Condition of Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy”, Law & 
History Review, Volume 26, at p. 68. 
 20  In Hungary, Article 3:162(1) of the Civil Code 2013: “Where according to the 
memorandum of association a member is required to provide less than half of their 
respective cash contribution before the application for registration is submitted, or if 
the memorandum of association provides for a time limit of over one year from the 
time of registration of the company for making available the part of the cash 
contribution that was not paid before the application for registration is submitted, the 
company may not be allowed to pay any dividend insofar as the unpaid profit 
calculated relative to the members core deposits according to the provisions on the 
payment of dividends reaches the initial capital together with the cash contributions 
which the members have already paid up.” 
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If, however, the company’s debts cannot be satisfied from the 
company’s assets, creditors may turn against the shareholders who still 
have not performed their full contributions as undertaken in the 
instrument of constitution of the company, and force them to pay the 
rest. It is an interesting observation how this rule made some plaintiffs 
to try their cases in situations of corporate torts against the creditors. 
Courts, however, systematically deny that such rules could give grounds 
to individual liability of the shareholders for torts committed by the 
company.21 It is clear that this rule was created only to help contractual 
creditors and not claims arisen from a tort.  
It appears to be the norm that shareholders may only be individually 
or jointly and severally liable toward third parties if these third parties 
are contractual creditors, and their claim arises from the fact that the 
company’s assets were insufficient to satisfy their claims. To summa-
rize, all fraudulent activities of the shareholders should somehow be 
connected to the intent to empty the company’s assets.  
Controlling Shareholders 
In both public and private companies, shareholders act through majority 
decisions. A majority decision typically requires the consent of more 
than one shareholders, therefore, liability cannot be imposed on one of 
them simply by stating that they governed the company into insolvency. 
In a company, the owners are the shareholders, while the control over 
the daily operation is the duty of the management. Company managers 
or directors bear liability for the actions they take to represent the 
company toward the company itself. In most jurisdictions, they are 
rarely liable directly towards the creditors of the company or third parties 
who suffer harms or damage as a result of some tortious activity.  
Usually, in tort cases, the directors are liable directly or jointly and 
severally with the company toward the third parties if they acted with 
intent.22 In contractual obligations, the legislator lists those cases when 
the directors owe a direct liability toward the company’s creditors.23 In 
__________________________________________________________ 
 21  In Germany, BGH VersR 1972, 274 M,D,R, 1972, at p. 316. 
 22  Hungarian Civil Code 2013, Article 6:540(3). 
 23 In Hungary, Article 33/A(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1991: “Any creditor or the 
liquidator — in the debtors name — may bring action during the liquidation 
proceedings for the court to establish that the former executives of the economic 
operator failed to properly represent the interests of creditors in the span of three 
years prior to the opening of liquidation proceedings in the wake of any situation 
carrying potential danger of insolvency, in consequence of which the economic 
operators assets have diminished, or that they prevented to provide full satisfaction 
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the latter cases, the so-called wrongful trading principles may serve as 
grounds for the director’s liability toward the creditors of the company 
in case the company’s assets are not enough to satisfy their claims. 
Shareholders on the other hand do not have individual and direct 
liability toward the creditors even in these cases as they only marked 
some strategical points for the daily operation through their decisions 
in the supreme body.  
This concept immediately changes when a shareholder gets the 
majority of the shares, or he de facto or de jure exercises control over 
the operation of the directors. Controlling shareholders dominate the 
company through their majority voting rights or through their control 
rights over the management/directors, and it leads to two special forms 
in the shareholders’ liability. 
In the first scenario, the controlling shareholder has majority votes, 
therefore, the decisions of the supreme body are heavily influenced by 
him, and they are dependent on his approval. As most national laws 
require simple majority in the supreme body for most decisions, a 
majority shareholder may easily decide over many important questions 
on his own. This dominant position makes him a sole shaper of the 
company’s strategies, and he may also be the one who can appoint or 
fire directors at will without the obligation to obtain consent from other 
shareholders.  
In the second scenario, the controlling shareholder has either de facto 
or de jure dominance over the managers of the company, so the directors 
act as for the order of the controlling shareholder. In such cases, the 
controlling shareholder’s liability may be similar to the director’s 
liability as the nature of their actions are comparable to the activities of 
the managers. Directors of the company must be loyal to the company, 
and it imposes the fiduciary duty of managers to serve the best interest 
of the company. Typically, the company’s interests come at first, and not 
the shareholders’. 
In practice, except for the specific cases of insolvency, the com-
pany’s interests may be very similar to the shareholders’ interests. The 
                                                                                                                      
    (FN 23 continued from previous page) 
    for the creditors’ claims, or failed to carry out the cleaning up of environmental 
damages. Any person with powers to influence the decision-making mechanisms 
of the economic operator shall also be considered an executive of the economic 
operator. If damage is caused by several persons together their liability shall be joint 
and several. A situation is considered to carry potential danger of insolvency as of 
the day when the executives of the economic operator were or should have been able 
to foresee that the economic operator will not be able to satisfy its liabilities when 
due.” 
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shareholders, as a group, form the company, so the director’s fiduciary 
duty can be interpreted as a duty toward the shareholders. National laws 
list various duties under the general scope of the fiduciary duty of the 
director, like the duty to fully disclose the conflict of interest and to 
obtain the shareholders’ approval in case there is a transaction between 
the company and the director. It also means that the breach of this duty 
may result a void transaction, and the breaching director will be liable 
for the profit he/she made under the transaction and for any loss the 
company might have suffered from the transaction.  
Some legal systems also entitle the company to recover damages 
from the third party as well.24 Another angle of the director’s fiduciary 
duty is that they bear individual liability for the consequences of their 
decisions toward the company. It requires directors to act using reasona-
ble skill and care that presumes some professionalism at their end. While 
shareholders may be treated as lay investors, directors cannot use the 
defense of being a bystander as their duty toward the company involves 
a professional standard of care. Legal systems provide various solutions to 
the problem on how to treat the liability of the controlling shareholder.  
English company law steps up with the concept of the shadow 
director. The shadow director is “a person in accordance with whose 
directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed 
to act”.25 This definition suggests that the act of the shadow director 
must amount to directions and instructions and must be intentionally 
influential to the activities of the de jure directors. While the definition 
of the shadow director is not that exact in Germany and Estonia, these 
civil law legal systems admit that in such cases the controlling 
shareholder’s liability must be similar to the de jure director’s.26 While 
a shadow director is not necessarily a controlling shareholder, in 
practice, he most likely holds a controlling block in the company. Once 
a controlling shareholder meets the requirements of a shadow director, 
English, German and Estonian company laws burden him with the same 
liability as for the de jure directors. 
The real conflict in this situation is that the supreme body of the 
company has a right to decide on actions against both the de jure 
directors and the shadow director. As it seems obvious that a controlling 
shareholder would never vote against himself, the supreme body may 
fail to take actions, English law created the category of derivative action 
__________________________________________________________ 
 24  Company Act 2006, Section 260(3). 
 25  Company Act 2006, Section 251(1). 
 26  German Stock Corporation Act 1965, Article 117(2); Estonian Commercial Code 
1995, Article 167(1).  
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when an individual shareholder can sue in the name of the company. 
Civil law legal systems (e.g., Germany and Estonia), however, take 
procedural boundaries more seriously, therefore, derivate actions are not 
available solutions there.  
Therefore, most civil law legal systems order that a controlling 
shareholder cannot vote in such cases, and the majority shall be counted 
among the other shareholders.27 The controlling shareholder is not a 
bystander in these cases, therefore, his biased vote will not count. While 
this special form of shareholders’ liability puts an increased level of 
vigilance on the controlling shareholder, one must emphasize that even 
in these cases, the general conditions of liability also must be met. It is 
important to stress as in the fault-based liability regimes, the malicious, 
fraudulent intent of the shadow director must be proved in order to 
impose liability on him. It, however, may be an interesting scenario if 
the national law imposes strict, no-fault based liability on the directors 
for the damage they cause to the company. Hungarian law is a great 
example to this setting. 
The new Hungarian Civil Code says very little about the liability of 
directors as it refers to the rules of liability for damages for loss caused 
by non-performance of an obligation.28 These latter rules impose strict 
liability to the breaching party, therefore, fault is irrelevant when 
deciding over the liability. As the new Code is quite young, judicial 
practice has not had a chance to further interpret how these rules on 
liability for non-performance of a contractual obligation should be 
applied in cases when a company director breaches his fiduciary duties, 
however, unless the breaching party successfully proves that unforesee- 
able circumstances beyond his control served as an impediment and that 
caused the breach, he is held liable for the damages in a no-fault system. 
As a derivative of the rules, we may say that in Hungary, a control-
ling shareholder who acts as a shadow director may be liable for any 
loss the company suffers as a consequence of improper management 
activities, disregarding his fault. It also implies that the de jure directors 
may be jointly and severally liable together with the shadow director for 
such damages. We do not believe that the de jure directors can easily 
defend themselves by referring to the fact that their actions were in-
structed and controlled by the shadow director (controlling shareholder), 
as their loyalty and fiduciary duty is toward the company and not one 
of its shareholders. 
__________________________________________________________ 
 27  Hungarian Civil Code 2013, Article 3:18. 
 28  Hungarian Civil Code 2013, Article 3:24. 
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European Union Approach to Shareholder Liability 
In 2007, the European Union’s Council and the European Parliament 
adopted a Directive on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in 
listed companies (the “Shareholder Rights Directive”).29 The Directive 
lists a series of rights granted to shareholders in listed companies, 
mainly in relation to their voting rights and rights to information. The 
Directive does not, however, cover the issues of liability of shareholders, 
while other bits of EU legislation contain small traces of the problem.  
The EU Directive on single-member private limited liability compa-
nies30 sets an obligation that the fact that all shares of the company is 
held by a single person along with the identity of the sole member must 
either be recorded in the file or entered in the company register in the 
Member States.31 This provision ensures that creditors will get proper 
information about the company being controlled by a single shareholder, 
therefore, it is much easier to enforce the rules enacted for the cases 
of shareholder liability against the only member of the company, even 
if these cases of liability are listed in the national laws of the Member 
States.  
None of the so-called company law directives contain clear liability 
rules against the shareholders, we may only find such situations estab-
lished in the national laws. The company law related norms of the EU 
have not moved to the direction when shareholders must act with due 
diligence and must prevent the company from getting insolvent. EU law 
does not impose clear fiduciary duties on the shareholders, it still 
focuses on the management-shareholder relationship where shareholders 
must be armed against the autonomous activities of the directors, 
therefore, rights to provide sufficient information about the company’s 
operation to the shareholders are the main concern. 
In April 2014, the European Commission presented a proposal for the 
revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive to tackle corporate 
governance shortcomings related to the behavior of companies and their 
boards, shareholders, intermediaries and proxy advisors. The proposal 
aims to strengthen shareholder engagement in listed companies in order 
__________________________________________________________ 
 29  Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.  
 30  Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 in the area of company law on single-member private limited 
liability companies. 
 31  Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 in the area of company law on single-member private limited 
liability companies, Article 3. 
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to make them more focused on the operation of the firm instead of being 
just simple investors. The proposal states that too often, shareholders 
support managers’ excessive short-term risk takings and do not monitor 
closely the companies they invested in. The proposal specifically 
mentions the lack of shareholder oversight on related party transactions 
as a source for the problem.  
According to the proposal, related party transactions cover transac-
tions between a company and its management, directors, controlling 
entities or shareholders. These transactions typically create the oppor-
tunity to obtain value belonging to the company to the detriment of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, therefore, they impose 
a huge risk on the solvency of the company. The proposed rules would 
require listed companies that related party transactions representing 
more than 5 per cent of the companies’ assets or transactions which can 
have a significant impact on profits or turnover to submit these transac-
tions to the approval of shareholders and may not unconditionally 
conclude it without their approval. 
The proposal, however, aims to provide more rights to the share-
holders, and plans to establish new obligations to the directors before 
engage the company into certain transactions. Failing to comply with the 
proposed rules would result liability for the directors, while the proposal 
does not cover the scenario when the shareholders abuse with these new 
rights and let a problematic and harmful transaction pass. One can see 
that EU law does not cover the problem of shareholders’ liability, so 
these questions are settled by national laws in very diverse ways. 
__________ 
 
Conclusion 
The concept of limited liability of the shareholders in a limited liability 
company started to erode from the moment the principle was established 
in order to cure the negative effects of the limited-liability doctrine in 
company law. At first, the legislator only focused on clearly fraudulent 
and malicious behaviors of the shareholders in order to penetrate the 
protective corporate veil and allow creditors and third parties to carry 
out a lawsuit against the shareholders in a limited liability company. 
These days, company law has to fulfill various interests.  
On one hand, it has to ensure that its flexible enough to boost 
economy and urge the formation of companies in a country by both 
nationals and foreign investors. On the other hand, company laws must 
be secure and certain enough in order to offer safeguards and protection 
  Tamás Fézer                                               17 
 
 
to the creditors, minority shareholders, employees and in some cases the 
members of the society.  
Corporate governance became an issue worldwide only in the last 
couple decades. This phenomenon does not only focus on the directors/ 
managers of the companies but to the shareholders in the company 
burdening them with a more vigilant overseeing obligation over the 
management and the activities of the company. The European Union has 
not moved to the direction of creating clear cases of shareholder’s 
liability and to the direction of burdening shareholders with controlling 
obligations. Therefore, there is no general standard for the shareholders 
on what grounds they may be found liable for the company’s debts or in 
case of corporate torts.  
Certain situations may find the shareholders in a position when they 
have to face an increased level of duty of care and act as directors 
burdened with clear fiduciary duties. These situations are typically 
linked to the problems of controlling shareholders who often act as 
shadow directors, or shareholders in a dominant position overseeing and 
controlling a group of companies. While we do not suggest that share-
holders must bear a general liability for the misconduct of the company 
towards third parties, the new trends in corporate governance certainly 
claim for an increased and more precise list of the duties of the share-
holders. The investor/shareholder position comes at many advantages 
in a limited liability company. Still, it should have its obligation side as 
well in order to establish a responsible behavior of companies toward 
the members of society and actors of the economy as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
